formalize the idea of forward induction reasoning as "rationality and common strong belief of rationality" (RCSBR). Here we study the behavioral implications of RCSBR across all type structures. Formally, we show that RCSBR is characterized by a solution concept we call extensive form best response sets (EFBRS's). It turns out that the EFBRS concept is equivalent to a concept already proposed in the literature, namely directed rationalizability (Battigalli and Siniscalchi 2003) . We conclude by applying the EFBRS concept to games of interest.
Introduction
Forward induction is a basic concept in game theory. It reflects the idea that players rationalize their opponents' behavior whenever possible. In particular, players form an assessment about the future play of the game, given the information about the past play and the presumption that their opponents are strategic. This affects the players' choices.
Formalizing forward induction reasoning requires an epistemic apparatus: To express the idea that players rationalize their opponents' past behavior, we need a language that explicitly describes what a player believes about the strategies her opponents play and the beliefs they hold at each information set. An (extensive-form based) epistemic type structure gives such a language.
The game
We consider finite extensive-form games of perfect recall. We write for such a game. The definition we consider is similar to that in Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, Definition 200.1) . In particular, it allows for simultaneous moves. 1 There are two players, namely a (Ann) and b (Bob). 2 Let C a and C b be choice or action sets for Ann and Bob. A history for the game consists of (possibly empty) sequences of simultaneous choices for Ann and Bob. More formally, a history is either (i) the empty sequence, written φ, or (ii) a sequence of choice pairs (c 1 c K ), where c k = (c k a c k b ) ∈ C a × C b . Histories have the property that if (c 1 c K ) is a history, then so is (c 1 c L ) for each L ≤ K. Each history can be viewed as a node in the tree, and so we interchangeably use the terms "node" and "history."
Write x for a history of the game and let C(x) = {c ∈ C a × C b : (x c) is a history for the game}. Write C a (x) = proj C a C(x) and C b (x) = proj C b C(x). By assumption, these sets have the property that C(x) = C a (x) × C b (x). The interpretation is that C a (x) is the set of choices available to a at history x. If |C a (x)| ≥ 2, say a moves at history x or a is active at x. (If |C a (x)| ≤ 1, a is inactive at history x.) Call x a terminal history of the game if C(x) = ∅. (Terminal histories can be viewed either as terminal nodes or paths for the game.)
Let H a (resp. H b ) be a partition of the set of all nodes at which a (resp. b) is active plus the initial node φ. The partition H a (resp. H b ) has the property that if x, x are contained in the same partition member, viz. h in H a (resp. H b ), then C a (x) = C a (x ) (resp. C b (x) = C b (x )). The interpretation is that H a (resp. H b ) is the family of information sets for a (resp. b). (Notice that {φ} ∈ H a ∩ H b . Perfect recall imposes further requirements on H a and H b . See Osborne and Rubinstein 1994, Definition 203.3.) Write H = H a ∪ H b .
Let Z be the set of terminal histories of the game and let z be an arbitrary element of Z. Extensive-form payoff functions are given by a : Z → R and b : Z → R.
We abuse notation and write C a (h) for the set of choices available to a at information set h ∈ H a . With this, the set of strategies for player a is given by S a = h∈H a C a (h). Define S b analogously. Each pair of strategies (s a s b ) induces a path through the tree. Let ζ : S a × S b → Z map each strategy profile into the induced path. Strategic-form payoff functions are given by π a = a • ζ and π b = b • ζ. Given a profile (s a s b ), write π(s a s b ) = (π a (s a s b ) π b (s a s b )) and refer to this payoff vector as an outcome of the game. Two strategy profiles, (s a s b ) and (r a r b ), are outcome equivalent if π(s a s b ) = π(r a r b ). (Of course, if (s a s b ) and (r a r b ) induce the same path (i.e., if ζ(s a s b ) = ζ(r a r b )), they are outcome equivalent. But, they may be outcome equivalent even if they do not.)
For each information set h ∈ H, write S a (h) (resp. S b (h)) for the set of strategies for a (resp. b) that allow h. (That is, s a ∈ S a (h) if there is some s b ∈ S b so that the path induced by (s a s b ) passes through h.) Let S a (resp. S b ) be the collection of all S a (h) (resp. S b (h)) for h ∈ H b (resp. h ∈ H a ). Thus, S a represents the information structure of b about the strategy of a. In particular, at each of b's information sets, he has a belief about a that assigns probability 1 to the set of a's strategies consistent with the information set being reached.
The type structure
This section defines an epistemic type structure. There are two ingredients: First, for each player, there are type sets T a and T b . Informally, each player "knows" his own type, but faces uncertainty about the strategy the other player will choose and the type of the other player. So each type t a ∈ T a is associated with a belief on S b × T b . Of course, we want to specify a belief at each information set. Therefore, we map each type into a conditional probability system (CPS) on S b × T b , where the conditioning events correspond to the information sets in the game tree. That is, for each type, there is an array of probability measures on S b × T b , one for each information set, and this array satisfies the rules of conditional probability when possible.
We now give the formal definitions. These closely follow the definitions in Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) . Throughout, let be a separable metrizable space and let B( ) be the Borel σ-algebra on . We endow the product of separable metrizable spaces with the product topology and endow a subset of a separable metrizable space with the relative topology. Write P( ) for the set of Borel probability measures on and endow P( ) with the topology of weak convergence.
Definition 1 (Rényi 1955) . Fix a separable metrizable space and a nonempty collection of events E ⊆ B( ). A conditional probability system (CPS) on ( E) is a mapping μ(·|·) : B( ) × E → [0 1] such that, for every E ∈ B( ) and F G ∈ E, the following statements hold:
(ii) μ(·|F) ∈ P( ), and (iii) E ⊆ F ⊆ G implies μ(E|G) = μ(E|F)μ(F|G).
Call E, with ∅ = E ⊆ B( ), a collection of conditioning events for .
When it is clear that μ(·|·) is a CPS on ( E), we omit reference to its arguments, simply writing μ instead of μ(·|·).
Write C( E) for the set of conditional probability systems on ( E). The set C( E) can be viewed as a subset of [P( )] E . We endow [P( )] E with the product topology and then endow C( E) with the relative topology. If E is countable, C( E) is separable metrizable. When the set of conditioning events is clear from the context, we omit reference to E, simply writing C( ).
We are often interested in product sets. We adopt the convention that if 1 × 2 = ∅, then both 1 = ∅ and 2 = ∅. Fix some E ⊆ B( 1 ) and write E ⊗ 2 for the set of all E × 2 , where E ∈ E. Of course, E ⊗ 2 ⊆ B( 1 × 2 ).
Consider a CPS μ(·|·) on ( 1 × 2 E ⊗ 2 ), where E ⊆ B( 1 ). Define ν(·|·) : B( 1 ) × E → [0 1] so that ν(E|F) = μ(E × 2 |F × 2 ) for all E ∈ B( 1 ) and F ∈ E. Then ν is a conditional probability system on ( 1 E). When ν(·|·) is defined in this way, write ν(·|·) = marg where T a (resp. T b ) is a nonempty separable metrizable space and β a : T a → C(S b × T b S b ⊗ T b ) (resp. β b : T b → C(S a × T a S a ⊗ T a )) is a measurable belief map. Members of T a (resp. T b ) are called types. Members of S a × T a × S b × T b are called states.
To illustrate Definition 2, consider two examples of -based type structures. Each is based on the game of the battle of the sexes (BoS) with an outside option as given in Figure 1 . Example 1. Suppose the game of BoS with an outside option is played in a society that has come to form a "lady's choice convention." Loosely, everyone in the society thinks that if the lady gets to move in a BoS-like situation, she makes choices that can lead to her "best payoff," i.e., she plays Up, hoping to get a payoff of 4. Moreover, it is "transparent" that everyone thinks this.
The convention restricts the beliefs players do vs. do not consider possible. 3 It can be modelled by a type structure S a S b ; S a S b ; T a T b ; β a β b based on the game in Figure 1 . The type structure satisfies the following conditions: Each type t b of Bob is mapped to a CPS on S a × T a that assigns probability 1 to {Up} × T a at each information set. Moreover, for each such CPS, there is a type of Bob, viz. t b , so that β b (t b ) is exactly that CPS. Likewise, for each CPS on S b × T b , there is a type of Ann, viz. t a , so that β a (t a ) is exactly that CPS. (See Battigalli and Friedenberg 2009 on how to construct such a structure.)
Notice that at each information set, each type of Bob assigns probability 1 to the event "Ann plays Up," i.e., to Ann trying to achieve her best payoff. There are no restrictions on Ann's beliefs about Bob's play of the game. This follows from β a being onto-for each belief she can have about S b , there is a type of Ann that has that belief. But at each information set, each type of Ann assigns probability 1 to the event "at each information set, Bob assigns probability 1 to the event 'Ann plays Up,'" and so on. In this sense, it is transparent that Bob thinks that if Ann gets to move, she will play Up. ♦ Example 2. Suppose the game of BoS with an outside option is played among players who have no reason to believe that the other players are more or less likely to choose a particular strategy or to have particular beliefs, etc. This idea can be modelled by a type structure that contains all possible conditional beliefs (about types), i.e., by a type structure S a S b ; S a S b ; T a T b ; β a β b based on the game in Figure 1 , where β a and β b are onto. This is known as a complete type structure. (The terminology is due to Brandenburger 2003.) One example of a complete type structure is the canonical construction of a type structure, as in Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999a) . That type structure induces all hierarchies of conditional beliefs. ♦
Rationality and strong belief
We now turn to the main epistemic definitions, all of which have counterparts with a and b reversed. Begin by extending π a (· ·) to S a × P(S b ) in the usual way, i.e., π a (s a a ) = s b ∈S b π a (s a s b ) a (s b ). Since the measure a on S b reflects a belief by a about b, we write a ∈ P(S b ).
Definition 3. Fix X a ⊆ S a and s a ∈ X a . Say s a is optimal under a ∈ P(S b ) given X a if π a (s a a ) ≥ π a (r a a ) for all r a ∈ X a .
Definition 4. Say s a ∈ S a is sequentially optimal under μ a (·|·) :
Definition 5. Say (s a t a ) is rational if s a is sequentially optimal under marg S b β a (t a ).
Let R a be the set of strategy-type pairs, viz. (s a t a ), at which a is rational.
Definition 6 (Battigalli and Siniscalchi 2002) . Fix a CPS μ(·|·) :
If a CPS μ strongly believes E and ∈ E, then μ(E| ) = 1. In our application, we have ∈ E. Of course, no CPS strongly believes the empty set.
Strong belief fails a monotonicity property, i.e., μ may strongly believe an event E but not some event F with E ⊆ F . (This can happen if there is some G ∈ E with E ∩ G = ∅ but F ∩ G = ∅.) But there are two important properties that strong belief does satisfy. (These properties are useful in our analysis.) Property 1 (Conjunction). Fix a CPS on ( E), viz. μ, and a finite or countable collection of events E 1 E 2 . If μ strongly believes E 1 E 2 , then μ strongly believes m E m .
Let SB a (E b ) be the set of strategy-type pairs (s a t a ) such that t a strongly believes event E b . That is, SB a (E b ) is the event that "Ann strongly believes E b ."
Now, we inductively define the set of states at which there is rationality and mthorder strong belief of rationality. Set R 1 a = R a (resp. R 1 b = R b ). The event that Ann is rational and Ann strongly believes "Bob is rational" is then
And the event that Ann is rational, Ann strongly believes "Bob is rational," and strongly believes "Bob is rational and strongly believes 'I am rational'" is 
The prediction of play under RCSBR is the projection of m R m a × m R m b on S a × S b . This prediction depends on both the given game and the given epistemic type structure.
Example 3. Return to Example 1, i.e., the BoS with an outside option game and the type structure associated with the lady's choice convention. (Recall, each β b (t b ) assigns probability 1 to {Up} × {T a } and the belief map β a is onto.) In this example, proj S a R m a × proj S b R m b is {Up Down} × {Out} for each m ≥ 1. m = 1: Since each type t b assigns probability 1 to {Up} × T a , (s b t b ) is rational if and only if s b = Out. Also, there is a CPS μ a (resp. ν a ) on S b × T b so that Up (resp. Down) is sequentially optimal under μ a (resp. ν a ). Since β a is onto, there is a type t a (resp. u a ) so that (Up t a ) ∈ R 1 a (resp. (Down u a ) ∈ R 1 a ). m ≥ 2: Assume the claim holds for m. Then R m+1 b
(The second inclusion follows from the induction hypothesis.) Since R m a ∩ ({Up} × T a ) = ∅, there is a type t b that assigns probability 1 to R m a at each information set. Any such type assigns probability 1 to each R n a , for n ≤ m, at each information set. So
Any such CPS μ a strongly believes each R n b where n ≤ m. (Here we use the fact that, for each n ≤ m, R m b ∩ ({In-Left In-Right} × T b ) = ∅.) For any such CPS, viz. μ a , there is a type t a whose belief is μ a . As such, there is a type t a so that (Up t a ) ∈ R m+1 a (resp. (Down t a ) ∈ R m+1 a ).
♦ Example 4. Return to Example 2, i.e., the BoS with an outside option game and a complete type structure. 
Now if t a strongly believes R 1 b , then t a must assign probability 1 to {In-Right} × T b , conditional on BoS being reached. So proj S a R 2 a ⊆ {Down}. Moreover, since β a is onto, there is a type t a that strongly believes R 1 b , so
With this, if t b strongly believes R 2 a , then t b must assign probability 1 to In-Right, conditional on In being played. So proj S b R 3 b ⊆ {In-Right}. Moreover, since β b is onto, there is a type t b that strongly believes R 2 a , so
A standard induction argument shows that, for each m ≥ 3, proj S a R m a × proj S b R m b = {Down} × {In-Right}. This is the extensive-form rationalizable set. ♦
Comparing Examples 3 and 4 we see that there is a nonmonotonicity in behavioral prediction of RCSBR: even if a type structure contains "more" beliefs, the RCSBR analysis in this "larger" structure can exclude an outcome allowed by an RCSBR analysis in the "smaller" one. To review why this can happen, observe that in the complete type structure (Example 4), there are types of Ann that assign positive probability to Bob's playing In-Left, conditional on Ann's information set being reached. But unlike the case of the lady's choice convention (Example 3), no such type can strongly believe the event that Bob is rational. The reason is that, unlike the case of the lady's choice convention, here there are types t b so that (In-Right t b ) is rational. Thus, in a sense, the nonmonotonicity in the behavioral prediction can be seen as arising from the nonmonotonicity of strong belief.
Example 5. For a given game and epistemic type structure, it may well be the case that m R m a = ∅ and m R m b = ∅. For instance, consider BoS with the outside option and a type structure where β a (t a )({In-Left} × T b |S b × T b ) = 1 for each t a . Each type of Ann initially assigns positive probability to a strictly dominated strategy of Bob. So SB a (R 1 b ) = ∅. Hence, R 2 a = ∅. It follows that SB b (R 2 a ) = ∅ and so R 3 b = ∅. ♦
Characterization theorem: EFBRS's
We now turn to characterizing RCSBR. For this it is useful to introduce a best reply correspondence, viz. ρ a : C(S b ) → 2 S a , where ρ a (μ a ) is the set of strategies that are sequentially optimal under μ a . We begin with extensive-form best response sets.
(ii) μ a strongly believes Q b , and
b. And, likewise, for each s b ∈ Q b .
Example 6. Return to BoS with the outside option as in Figure 1 . There are three EFBRS: {Up Down} × {Out}, {Up} × {Out}, and {Down} × {In-Right}. The first of these is the set of strategies consistent with RCSBR when we append to the game the type structure associated with the lady's choice convention. (See Example 3.) The latter of these is the set of strategies consistent with RCSBR when we append to the game a complete type structure. (See Example 4.) ♦ Why is the EFBRS definition "right" for characterizing RCSBR? Fix some (s a t a ) ∈ R m a . We can immediately identify the first two properties of Definition 9. For the first, recall that s a is optimal under the CPS associated with t a , namely β a (t a ). It follows that s a is optimal under the marginal of β a (t a ) on S b (a CPS on Bob's strategies). For the second, recall that t a strongly believes the events R 1 b , R 2 b , R 3 b , etc. So, by the conjunction property of strong belief, t a strongly believes the event R m b . It then follows from a marginalization property of strong belief that the marginal of β a (t a ) on S b strongly believes Q b (i.e., the projection of R m b onto S b ). Thus, Q a × Q b satisfies both conditions (i) and (ii) of an EFBRS for (s a μ a ), where we take μ a to be the marginal of β a (t a ) on S b .
But conditions (i) and (ii) do not suffice to characterize RCSBR: We can have a set Q a × Q b that satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) but is inconsistent with RCSBR (for every type structure). This is illustrated by the next example.
Example 7. Consider the game in Figure 2 and the set Q a × Q b = {Out} × {Left Center}. We see that the set Q a × Q b satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) of Definition 9. But for each type structure, proj S a m R m a ∩ {Out} = ∅. That is, for each type structure, Out is inconsistent with RCSBR.
First we show that Q a × Q b satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) of Definition 9. Begin with Ann and consider the CPS that assigns probability to Left : Center at each information set. The strategy Out is sequentially optimal under this CPS. Of course, this CPS strongly believes Q b . Turning to Bob, consider a CPS that assigns probability 1 to Out at the initial node and probability Next we show that for each type structure, proj S a m R m a ∩ {Out} = ∅. Suppose, contra hypothesis, that there exist some type structure and some type t a so that (Out t a ) ∈ m R m a . Certainly, (Out t a ) is rational and t a strongly believes each R m b . Since each 66 Battigalli and Friedenberg Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) Figure 2. The need for maximality.
pair in {Right} × T b is irrational and t a strongly believes "Bob is rational," the type t a is associated with a CPS that (at each node) assigns probability 1 to {Left Center} × T b . Now, since (Out t a ) is rational, the CPS associated with t a must assign probability What went wrong in this example? We began with a set Q a × Q b satisfying conditions (i) and (ii). In particular, we had a strategy s a ∈ Q a for which there was a unique CPS μ a (s a ), so that s a and μ a (s a ) satisfy conditions (i) and (ii). But there was also a strategy r a ∈ S a \ Q a that was sequentially optimal under μ a (s a ). (Actually, there were two such strategies.) As a result, if (s a t a ) is consistent with RCSBR, then (r a t a ) must also be consistent with RCSBR. Thus, there may be a strategy of Ann that is consistent with RCSBR, but is not contained in Q a . And, if so, we may be able to find an s b and a CPS μ b (s b ) (on S a ) so that s b and μ b (s b ) satisfy conditions (i) and (ii), despite the fact that s b is not optimal under any CPS (on S a × T a ) that strongly believes the RCSBR strategy-type pairs for Ann.
This suggests that we need to add a maximality criterion to conditions (i) and (ii) 
b is the same for each information set with
Conditions (i) and (ii) of a CPS are immediate. For condition (iii), fix an event E b and two information sets h i ∈ H a with
where the first and fourth lines follow from the construction, the second line follows from the fact that μ a (t a ) is a CPS, and the third line follows from the fact that
(This uses the fact that μ a (t a )(Q b |S b (i)) = 1, which follows from strong belief.) So, here too,
as required.
We conclude the proof by showing
and likewise with a and b interchanged. Taken together, they give the desired result. Part (1): Recall that for each t a ∈ T a = Q a , μ a (t a ) = marg S b β a (t a ). So it is immediate from the construction that Q a ⊆ t a ∈T a ρ a (marg S b β a (t a )). Conversely, fix any strategy s a in t a ∈T a ρ a (marg S b β a (t a )). Then there is a type t a ∈ T a = Q a so that s a is sequentially optimal under μ a (t a )(·|·). It follows from part (iii) of the definition of an EFBRS that s a ∈ Q a . Part (2): The proof is by induction on m. The equation is immediate for m = 1. Assume the result holds for m. To show that it holds for m + 1, it suffices to show that each t a ∈ T a strongly believes R m b . For this, fix an information set h such that
(The first equality follows from the induction hypothesis for b; the second equality fol-
Part (i) of Theorem 1 says that the projection of the RCSBR event on S a × S b is an EFBRS. But this may form an empty EFBRS. That said, there is always a nonempty EFBRS.
Remark 1. For any game, there exists a nonempty EFBRS-namely, the set of extensiveform rationalizable strategy profiles. Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999a) show that for each , there exists a completebased type structure with compact metrizable type sets. 4 Proposition 6 in Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) says that for each such complete structure, the projection of the RCSBR event onto S a × S b is the set of extensive-form rationalizable strategies. So using Theorem 1(i), this set is an EFBRS. The fact that it is nonempty is shown as Corollary 1 in Battigalli (1997) .
Alternate characterization theorem: Directed rationalizability
Return to the lady's choice convention example, i.e., Example 1. There, each type of Bob is associated with some CPS that assigned probability 1 to {Up} × T a . This gives a restriction on Bob's first-order beliefs, i.e., his beliefs about what Ann chooses. Let b represent this restriction on first-order beliefs. So b is a subset of the CPS's on S a and, in our example, b contains only the CPS that assigns probability 1 to Up at each information set. We do not have a restriction on Ann's first-order beliefs. So we write a for the set of all CPS's on S b .
With = a × b in hand, we can take an iterative approach to analyzing the game tree-much like a "typical rationalizability" procedure. In round one, we eliminate In-Left and In-Right for Bob, since these strategies are not sequentially optimal under the CPS in b . We do not eliminate any of Ann's strategies, since they are each sequentially optimal under some CPS (in a ). So in round one, we are left with the set {Up Down} × {Out}. Turning to round two, Out is sequentially optimal under the CPS in b and that CPS strongly believes {Up Down}. Thus, we cannot eliminate Out in round two. Likewise, Up (resp. Down) is sequentially optimal under a CPS that assigns probability 1 to Out at the initial node and probability 1 to Left (resp. Right) at Bob's subgame. This CPS is contained in a and strongly believes {Out}. So we also get {Up Down} × {Out} in round two. Indeed, a standard induction argument gives that {Up Down} × {Out} is the outcome of the procedure. Of course, this is the EFBRS we identify in Section 4.
The procedure we use above is called -rationalizability; see Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003) . 5 More generally, let a (resp. b ) be a nonempty subset of C(S b ) (resp. C(S a )), i.e., a set of first-order beliefs of Ann (resp. Bob). Call = a × b a set of firstorder beliefs. Set S . And likewise with a and b interchanged. 6 4 Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999a) canonical construction is a type structure in the sense of Definition 2.
Specifically, in the case of a game tree, the basic conditioning events are clopen and so Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999a) get T a and T b to be compact metrizable as an output.
5 Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003) use the concept to study a different problem from the one studied here.
In their problem, the set is given to the analyst. In our problem, may be unknown to the analyst and we obtain a characterization across all 's. See Section 9.a. 6 This definition is as in Battigalli (1999) . It is a stronger requirement than the definition in Battigalli and
Siniscalchi ( . Of course, there may be many -rationalizable sets, each of which is obtained by beginning the procedure with a different set of first-order beliefs = a × b . We use the phrase directed rationalizability to refer to the set of all S a × S b . So, for a given game , the directed rationalizability concept gives
Beginning from the lady's choice example, we can use the type structure to construct an associated set of first-order beliefs and this set of first-order beliefs can be used to perform -rationalizability. The output is the EFBRS we identified earlier. But the lady's choice convention has a particular feature: it is a restriction on first-order beliefs and a requirement that the restriction be "transparent" to the players. So the only restriction on second-order beliefs (i.e., beliefs about strategy the other player chooses and the other player's the first-order beliefs) is the requirement that at each information set, Ann must believe that Bob believes she will play Up and so on. It is this transparency of (only) first-order restrictions that allows us to directly compute the associated directed rationalizability set.
More generally, when we begin from a given type structure, we impose substantive assumptions about which beliefs players do versus do not consider possible. These assumptions may correspond to restrictions (only) on players' first-order beliefs, which are transparent to the players. But they need not: they may involve additional restrictions on higher-order beliefs, and if they do, the procedure we outline above fails.
To see the failure, begin with an epistemic type structure and use the structure itself to form the set¯ =¯ a ×¯ b . Specifically, for each type t a ∈ T a , consider the marginal of β a (t a ) on S b . These CPS's form the set¯ a . Construct the set¯ b analogously. Here, the strategies that survive one round of¯ -rationalizability are exactly the strategies that are consistent with R0SBR a × R0SBR b . But, in round two, we lose the equivalence: If β a (t a ) strongly believes the event "Bob is rational," then the marginal of β a (t a ) also strongly believes that "Bob chooses a strategy consistent with one round of elimination of¯ -rationalizability." (Here, we use a marginalization property of strong belief, plus the round-one equivalence.) But the converse need not hold. So the strategies that survive two rounds of¯ -rationalizability may strictly contain the R1SBR strategies. And on round three, we loose the inclusion. If the CPSβ a (t a ) strongly believes the R1SBR event for Bob, then the marginal of β a (t a ) also strongly believes that "Bob chooses a strategy consistent with R1SBR." But recall that the strategies consistent with R1SBR may . Any set that satisfies the requirements here also satisfies the requirements in Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003) be strictly contained in the strategies that survive two rounds of¯ -rationalizability. So there may be information sets consistent with this latter event, but not the former. This implies that even if β a (t a ) strongly believes the R1SBR event for Bob, it need not strongly believe that Ann's behavior is consistent with two rounds of¯ -rationalizability. (This is an instance of the fact that strong belief is not monotonic.) As such, we can lose (any) relationship between the RCSBR strategies and the¯ -rationalizable strategy set. In fact, Appendix B illustrates an example where the RCSBR strategy set and the¯ -rationalizable strategy set are disjoint.
There is another route that instead uses the EFBRS properties to form a set = a × b of first-order beliefs. Fix an epistemic structure. The RCSBR strategies form an EFBRS, viz. Q a × Q b . For each s a ∈ Q a , we have some CPS μ a (s a ) satisfying the conditions of an EFBRS. Take a to be the set of such CPS's, i.e., one for each s a ∈ Q a , and construct b similarly. Now we do have an equivalence between the RCSBR strategies and the -rationalizable strategies. More precisely, for each m ≥ 1, Q a × Q b is the set of strategies that survives m-rounds of elimination of -rationalizability. The case of m = 1 follows from properties (i) and (iii) of an EFBRS, the case of m = 2 uses condition (ii) of an EFBRS, and so on, by induction. Proposition 1. Fix an extensive-form game .
(ii) Given a set of first-order beliefs, viz.
Thus, in conjunction with Theorem 1, we have the following alternate characterization theorem.
Corollary 1. Fix an extensive-form game . (i) For any -based type structure, there exists a set of first-order beliefs
(ii) Fix a set of first-order beliefs, viz. a × b . Then there exists a -based structure so that
Proof of Proposition 1. Begin with part (i) . Fix an EFBRS set Q a × Q b . For each s a ∈ Q a , there exists a corresponding CPS μ a (s a ) ∈ C(S b ) satisfying conditions (i)-(iii) of an EFBRS for Q a × Q b . Take a so that, for each s a ∈ Q a , a contains exactly one such CPS μ a (s a ). There are no other CPS's in a . Define b analogously. We show that for
The proof is by induction. Begin with m = 1. Certainly Q a ⊆ S 1 a . Fix s a ∈ S 1 a . Then there exists some μ a ∈ a so that s a is sequentially optimal under μ a . This CPS μ a is associated with some r a ∈ Q a , i.e., so that r a and μ a jointly satisfy conditions (i)-(iii) of an EFBRS. Now apply condition (iii) of an EFBRS to get that s a ∈ Q a . Now fix m ≥ 2 and assume S n a × S n b = Q a × Q b for all n ≤ m. We show that it also holds for m + 1. Fix s a ∈ Q a = S m a . Then using the construction of a , there exists some μ a ∈ a satisfying conditions (i) and (ii) of an EFBRS for Q a × Q b , so that s a ∈ ρ a (μ a ) and μ a strongly believes
. Conversely, fix some s a ∈ S m+1 a . Then there exists a CPS μ a ∈ a so that s a ∈ ρ a (μ a ) and μ a strongly believes S m b
. Again, since each element of a satisfies conditions (i)-(iii) of an EFBRS for some r a ∈ Q a , it follows that ρ a (μ a ) ⊆ Q a and so s a ∈ Q a . Now turn to part (ii) of the proposition. Fix some set of first-order beliefs, viz. =
. Fix s a ∈ S a . There exists a CPS μ a so that s a ∈ ρ a (μ a ) and μ a strongly believes each S m b for m ≤ M. Thus s a and μ a satisfy conditions (i) and (ii) of an EFBRS for Q a × Q b = S a × S b . Moreover, if r a ∈ ρ a (μ a ), then r a is optimal under a CPS that strongly believes each S m b for m ≤ M.
As such, r a ∈ S m a for each m ≤ M, establishing that r a ∈ S a . Therefore, condition (iii) of an EFBRS is also satisfied. A similar argument applies to b. Therefore, S a × S b is an EFBRS.
The proof of Proposition 1 gives an ancillary result. Begin with some finite set of firstorder beliefs, viz. = a × b . Proposition 1(ii) says that S a ×S b is an EFBRS. Conversely, begin with some EFBRS. The proof of Proposition 1(i) says that we can find a finite set of first-order beliefs, viz. = a × b , so that S a × S b is this EFBRS.
Remark 2. Fix a game tree . The directed rationalizability set is
Thus, using the EFBRS properties, we can see that we need only to compute therationalizable sets for finite sets of first-order beliefs. Of course, much as is the case with EFBRS's, the -rationalizable strategy set may be empty. When = C(S a ) × C(S b ), S a × S b is the extensive-form rationalizable strategy set. So in keeping with Remark 1, there always exists a nonempty -rationalizable strategy set.
While the EFBRS and directed rationalizability concepts are equivalent, it often is useful to focus on the former definition. The reason is that properties (i), (ii), and (iii) of an EFBRS give some immediate implications in terms of behavior. In Sections 7 and 8, we discuss the consequences of context-dependent forward reasoning for some specific games. There the EFBRS properties play an important role, much in the same way that the properties of a self-admissible set (Brandenburger et al. 2008 ) play an important role in analyzing games. Indeed, we see that these properties help to analyze games such as centipede, the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, and perfect information games.
Analyzing games
In this section, we analyze the predictions of RCSBR in games of interest. We do so by making use of the properties of an EFBRS and not the (equivalent) directed rationalizability definition. Example 8. Consider the three-legged centipede game given in Figure 3 . Here, the EFBRS's are {Out} × {Down} and {Out} × {Down Across}. In particular, there is no EFBRS where Ann plays In at the first node. To see this, suppose otherwise, i.e., suppose there exists an EFBRS Q a × Q b and a strategy s a ∈ Q a , where s a plays In at the first node. By condition (i) of an EFBRS, we must have that Q a ⊆ {Out In-Down}, so that s a = In-Down. Now, fix s b ∈ Q b and recall that s b must be sequentially optimal under a CPS that strongly believes Q a . Then, at Bob's information set, this CPS must assign probability 1 to In-Down. Since s b is sequentially optimal under this CPS, s b = Down. So we have that Q b = {Down}. But then In-Down cannot simultaneously satisfy conditions (i) and (ii) of an EFBRS. ♦
The argument we present for the three-legged centipede is more general: Fix an EFBRS of the n-legged centipede game. Then the first player chooses Out. This result is a consequence of Proposition 3(i) to come. Example 9. Figure 4 gives the prisoner's dilemma. Consider the 3-repeated version of the game. Let Q a × Q b be a nonempty EFBRS. Then each (s a s b ) ∈ Q a × Q b results in the Defect-Defect path. 7 Let us give an intuition: By condition (i) of an EFBRS, each strategy s a ∈ Q a (resp. s b ∈ Q b ) is sequentially justifiable. As such, s a (resp. s b ) plays Defect in the last period at each history allowed by s a (resp. s b ). Now consider a second period information set h, where s a ∈ S a (h) and Q b ∩ S b (h) = ∅. By conditions (i) and (ii) of an EFBRS, s a must be sequentially optimal under a CPS μ a (s a ) with μ a (s a )(Q b |S b (h)) = 1. Then, conditional on h, μ a (s a ) assigns probability 1 to Bob defecting in the third period, irrespective of Ann's play. As such, s a plays D at h. And likewise with a and b reversed.
Turn to the first period and suppose, contra hypothesis, there is some s a ∈ Q a so that s a initially chooses C. For each s a ∈ Q b , (s a s b ) results in the Defect-Defect path in periods two and three. So Ann's expected payoffs from s a corresponds to her first period expected payoffs from playing s a . With this, the Defect-always strategy yields a strictly higher expected payoff in the first period and an expected payoff of at least zero in subsequent periods. This contradicts s a being optimal under μ a (s a )(·|S b ). ♦ An analogous result holds for the N-repeated prisoner's dilemma for N finite. The proof is given in Appendix C.
Let us take stock of the examples above. First, in battle of the sexes with the outside option, we get that either (i) Bob plays Out or (ii) Bob plays In-Right and Ann plays Down. Each of these were subgame perfect paths of play. In centipede, we get the backward induction path (but not necessarily the backward induction strategies). Likewise, in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, we get the unique Nash (and so subgame perfect) path, where each player plays Defect in all periods.
In each of these cases, the outcomes allowed by an EFBRS coincide with the outcomes allowed by some subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). This raises the question, Are the EFBRS concept and the SPE concept equivalent? If so, then we have a good idea what the EFBRS concept delivers (in games of interest), since we have a good idea about what SPE delivers.
The EFBRS and SPE concepts are not equivalent, but in a particular class of games, any pure-strategy SPE corresponds to some EFBRS. Each of the examples we mentioned is contained in this class of games.
Definition 11. Say a game has observable actions if each information set is a singleton.
To understand the definition, recall that in our setup, both a and b have a choice at each history. (Of course, it may be the case that only one of the players is active.) So a game with observable actions is a game where the players begin by making simultaneous choices, learn the realization of the choices, and then perhaps make simultaneous choices, etc., until a terminal history is reached.
Given distinct terminal histories, viz. z and z , we can write z = (x c 1 c K ) and
, where x is the last common predecessor of z and z , i.e., Definition 13 (Battigalli 1997) . A game of observable actions satisfies no relevant ties (NRT) if, whenever a (resp. b) is decisive for (z z ), then a (z) = a (z ). A game with no ties satisfies NRT, but the converse does not hold. Reny's (1993, Figure 1 ) take-it-or-leave-it game is one such example.
Fix a strategy s a and write [s a ] for the set of all r a that induce the same plan of action as s a , i.e., the set of all r a so that ζ(r a ·) = ζ(s a ·), and likewise define 
Each of the examples we have seen satisfies both observable actions and NRT. In those examples, any pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium (s a s b ) belongs to an EFBRS, where the EFBRS only allows the terminal node ζ(s a s b ). This fits with part (ii) of the proposition. Part (i) says that even if the game fails NRT, (s a s b ) still is contained in some EFBRS. Example 12 in Appendix C provides a game that fails NRT, so that any EFBRS that contains a certain pure-strategy SPE also allows other paths of play.
Proposition 2 does not say that the pure-strategy SPE concept and the EFBRS concept are equivalent. A game without observable actions may have a pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium whose outcome is precluded by any EFBRS. Conversely, a given EFBRS may allow outcomes that are precluded by any (even randomized) subgame perfect equilibrium. (This can happen even in a game with observable actions and NRT.) The next examples demonstrate these points.
Example 10. The game in Figure 5 satisfies NRT but fails the observable actions condition. It is obtained from the game in Figure 2 by two transformations. First, the simultaneous move subgame is transformed into a game where Ann moves first and then Bob moves not knowing Ann's choice. Second, two of Ann's decision nodes are coalesced.
Here, (Out Right) is a pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium. But applying the argument in Section 5, Out is not contained in any EFBRS. 8 ♦ Figure 6 . A common interest game.
Example 11. The game in Figure 6 satisfies both NRT and the observable actions condition. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium is (In-Across Across), which results in the (3 3) outcome. Indeed, this profile induces an EFBRS, viz. {In-Across} × {Across}. But there are two EFBRS's that give the (2 2) outcome, namely {Out} × {Down} and {Out} × {Down Across}. ♦ Taken together with the main theorem (Theorem 1), Example 11 says that a nonbackward induction outcome, namely (2 2), is consistent with RCSBR. To understand this better, notice that Out is the unique best response for Ann under a CPS that assigns probability 1 to the event "Bob plays Down." So if each type of Ann assigns probability 1 to {Down} × T b , then conditional on Bob's node being reached, he must conclude that Ann is irrational. In this case, Bob may very well believe that Ann is playing In-Down; if so, Down is a unique (sequential) best response for Bob.
Perfect-information games
Example 10 shows that in games without observable actions, the SPE concept allows for outcomes that are excluded by every EFBRS. Alternatively, Proposition 2 and Example 11 show that in games with observable actions, the SPE concept is a strict refinement of the EFBRS concept. Thus, even in these games, we cannot use the SPE concept to analyze the consequences of RCSBR.
Now we turn to a particular class of games with observable actions, namely perfectinformation games (i.e., games with observable actions and with at most one active player at each information set). We have seen some examples of perfect-information games, e.g., Examples 8 and 11. In the former case, each EFBRS yields the backward induction path (and so the backward induction outcome). Of course, for that game, the Nash and backward induction paths coincide. Alternatively, in Example 11, one EFBRS corresponds to backward induction, but others do not. However, there we do get that the EFBRS paths correspond (exactly) to the Nash paths (and so Nash outcomes) of the game.
The examples suggest there may be a connection between EFBRS's and Nash outcomes, at least for perfect-information (PI) games. (Of course, for non-PI games, an EFBRS may give non-Nash outcomes.) Indeed, there is a connection for PI games satisfying a "no ties" condition. Definition 14 (Marx and Swinkels 1997) Why the connection between EFBRS's and Nash equilibria? Recall that if each player is "rational" (i.e., maximizes subjective expected utility) and places probability 1 on the actual strategy choices by the other player, then the strategy choices constitute a Nash equilibrium. In a PI game that satisfies TDI, RCSBR imposes a form of correct beliefs about the actual outcomes that obtain. Let us recast this at the level of the solution concept: In a PI game that satisfies TDI, each strategy profile in a given EFBRS is outcome equivalent. (This is Lemma 8 in Appendix D.) So along the path of play, the associated CPS('s) must assign probability 1 to a particular outcome-the outcome associated with the EFBRS, i.e., the "correct" outcome. (This uses condition (ii) of an EFBRS.) With this, we get a Nash outcome (but not necessarily the Nash strategies). 9 This was the intuition for part (i) of Corollary 2. The proof closely follows the proof of Proposition 6.1a in Brandenburger and Friedenberg (2010) , although now making use of the EFBRS properties. (The proof in Brandenburger and Friedenberg 2010 makes use of properties of self-admissible sets.)
The converse, i.e., part (ii), is novel. (In particular, both the "no ties" condition and the proof are quite different from the analysis in Brandenburger and Friedenberg 2010.) A Nash equilibrium in sequentially justifiable strategies, in general, satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) of an EFBRS. However, it may fail the maximality criterion. Indeed, the proof makes use of all three properties of Definition 9; see Appendix D.
There is a gap between parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 3. In particular, part (i) says that starting from an EFBRS, we can get a pure Nash outcome, while part (ii) says that starting from a sequentially justifiable pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, we can get an EFBRS.
We cannot improve part (ii) to say that starting from any pure Nash equilibrium, we get an EFBRS. (This is because a Nash equilibrium may not be sequentially justifiable; see Appendix D.) We do not know if we can improve part (i) to say that starting from an EFBRS, we get a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in sequentially justifiable strategies. (Appendix D elaborates on this issue.) However, starting from an EFBRS, we can get a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium that satisfies a "sequential justifiability" condition.
Consider a pure-strategy profile (s a s b ) and a mixed-strategy profile Proposition 4 gives that if we begin with an EFBRS, we can construct an equivalent mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium has the property that each strategy in its support is sequentially justifiable. But it is important to note that this does not necessarily give that the mixed-strategy itself is sequentially justifiable. 10 More to the point, given a PI game that satisfies TDI and some mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, viz. (σ a σ b ), does there exist some pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, viz. (s a s b ), so that s a (resp. s b ) is contained in the support of σ a (resp. σ b )? If so, using Proposition 4, we get that starting from an EFBRS, there is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in sequentially justifiable strategies. But this too is not known.
Discussion
In this section, we discuss some conceptual aspects of the paper as well as some extensions.
9.a Context-dependent forward induction
We characterize the behavioral implications of forward induction reasoning across all type structures. Why the interest in such a result?
When we analyze a strategic situation, we specify the game (matrix or tree). But, in practice, there is a context to the strategic situation studied-e.g., players come to the game with social conventions, a history, etc. This context influences what beliefs players do vs. do not consider possible. If this is the case, it may be of interest to study a given game relative to different type structures, depending on the context within which the game is played.
One case of particular interest is where the analyst does not know the context, i.e., does not know which beliefs are vs. are not "transparent" to the players. If this is the case, the analyst will want to understand the behavioral implications of forward induction reasoning across all type structures. By Theorem 1, he should apply the EFBRS concept. (Contrast this with extensive-form rationalizability: The analyst should apply the extensive-form rationalizability concept, if he is interested in forward induction reasoning and understands that the players consider all possible beliefs. This is the implication of Proposition 6 in Battigalli and Siniscalchi 2002.) 
9.b Restrictions on beliefs
In Section 9.a, we implicitly equated analyzing forward induction reasoning across all "transparent restrictions on players beliefs" with analyzing forward induction reasoning across all type structures. We can make this step precise. First, formalize the idea that certain (events about) beliefs are transparent to the players. For this, begin with Battigalli and Siniscalchi's (1999a) canonical construction of a type structure; this type structure contains all hierarchies of conditional beliefs (satisfying coherency and common belief of coherency). Let us look at the self-evident events within this structure. Loosely, we look at events S a × E a × S b × E b ∈ B(S a × T a × S b × T b ) such that whenever E = S a × E a × S b × E b obtains, there is "common belief of E" in the following sense: each player assigns probability 1 to E at each node, each player assigns probability 1 at each node to the other player assigning probability 1 to E at each node, etc. 11 These selfevident events represent transparent restrictions on players' beliefs. Each type structure can be mapped into the canonical construction and, in a certain sense, each type structure forms a self-evident event in the canonical construction, i.e., under this mapping. 12 Furthermore, each such self-evident event in the canonical type structure corresponds to a "smaller" type structure. Forward induction reasoning is preserved under these mappings. (There is an equivalence between rationality in the small structure and "rationality and the self-evident event" in the large structure, and similarly for strong belief; see Battigalli and Friedenberg 2009 for the formal statement.) There is a special type of transparent restriction on beliefs: those generated only by restrictions on first-order beliefs. In this case, there are explicit restrictions on first-order beliefs and the only restrictions on higher-order beliefs are those generated implicitly by the restrictions on first-order beliefs. (For instance, in the lady's choice convention, we explicitly restrict Bob's first-order beliefs, requiring that he assign probability 1 to Ann playing Up. This implicitly imposes a strong restriction on Ann's second-order beliefs, requiring that she assign probability 1 to the event "Bob assigns probability 1 to Ann playing Up" and so on; see Example 1.) The restrictions on first-order beliefs, viz. , generate a particular type of self-evident event. Analyzing RCSBR within the associated type structure leads to the -rationalizable strategy set. Indeed, this is related to Battigalli and Siniscalchi's (2003) motivation in defining directed rationalizability. 13 
9.c Two versus three player games
Here we have focused on two-player games. The main results (Theorem 1 and Corollary 1) extend to games with three or more players, up to issues of correlation. Specifically, if we allow for correlated assessments in Definition 8, then we must also allow for correlated assessments in Definition 9. A similar statement holds for the case of independence-although, of course, care is needed in defining independence for CPS's. The central issue is that Charlie's belief about Bob should not change after Charlie learns information only about Ann. (The idea dates back to Hammond 1987 and is related to the "do not signal what you do not know" condition of Fudenberg and Tirole 1991. See Battigalli 1996 for a formalization of the idea and a discussion of Fudenberg and Tirole 1991.) There is an additional issue that arises in the three-player case: Should we require that Ann strongly believes "Bob and Charlie are rational" or should we instead require that Ann strongly believes "Bob is rational" and strongly believes "Charlie is rational"? Arguably, in the case of independence, we should require the latter.
How does this affect our analysis of games? Amend Figure 6 , so that it is a threeplayer game as in Figure 7 . Consider a state at which there is RCSBR in the sense explained above (i.e., Bob has an independent assessment and strongly believes both "Ann 13 The treatment here is due to Battigalli and Prestipino (2011) . It is related to, but somewhat different from, the epistemic assumptions of Siniscalchi (2003, 2007) . It is important to note that under either treatment, an amendment is needed to Battigalli and Siniscalchi's (2003) definition of -rationalizability; see footnote 6.
is rational" and "Charlie is rational"). Let us ask which strategies can be played. Of course, using rationality, Charlie must play Across (at this state). Next we require that a type of Bob strongly believes "Ann is rational" and also "Charlie is rational." So, conditional on Bob's information set being reached, this type must maintain a hypothesis Charlie is rational, and so that Charlie plays Across. In this case, Bob's unique best response is to play In. Turning to Ann, we see that under an RCSBR analysis, she chooses In. So we only get the backward induction outcome. (Battigalli and Siniscalchi 1999b provide a "context free" epistemic analysis of this notion of independent rationalization.) This example also shows that in the case of independence, Proposition 3(ii) does not hold. If we instead consider the case of correlation, then it may also be natural to instead require that Bob strongly believes "Ann and Charlie are rational" (i.e., as opposed to strong belief of "Ann is rational" and strong belief of "Charlie is rational"). Of course, it may be the case that when Bob's node is reached, he must forgo the hypothesis that "Ann and Charlie are rational." Thus, in this case, we do have an analogue of Proposition 3(ii). Indeed, both parts (i) and (ii) 
Appendix B: Directed rationalizability
In the text, we argue that for each epistemic type structure, there is a set of first-order beliefs so that the projection of the RCSBR set is the -rationalizable strategy set. The purpose of this appendix is to illustrate that this set of first-order beliefs may not correspond to the set of all first-order beliefs allowed by the epistemic type structure. Suppose society has formed a modified version of the lady's choice convention. Now, there are no restrictions on players' first-order beliefs. (So, in particular, there are types of Bob who think Ann does not go for her best payoff.) But there is a restriction on Ann's second-order beliefs. Specifically, conditional on observing so-called normal behavior (i.e., a decision to Not Burn), Ann thinks that Bob thinks she goes for her best payoff and chooses Up. There is no restriction on Ann's second-order belief conditional on The set of first-order beliefs induced by this type structure is = C(S b ) × C(S a ). The -rationalizable set is {Down-down} × {NB-Right}. (This is also the set of extensive-form rationalizable strategies.) It is obtained as follows: In round one, the strategy B-left is dominated by NB-Left, but all other strategies (of both players) are optimal under some CPS. It follows that
But now note that the choice of up by Ann cannot be optimal under any CPS that strongly believes {NB-Left NB-Right B-right}. (If a CPS strongly believes {NB-Left NB-Right B-right}, then conditional on Burn being played, the CPS must assign probability 1 to right, in which case up is not a best response.) So
Turning to Bob, if a CPS strongly believes {Up-down Down-down}, then B-right yields an expected payoff of 2 and NB-Left yields an expected payoff of at most 1. So
Now, if a CPS strongly believes {NB-Right B-right}, Down-down is the only sequentially optimal strategy, so
Finally, if a CPS strongly believes {Down-down}, NB-Right is the only sequentially optimal strategy, so
But the projection of event RCSBR onto S a × S b is {Up-down} × {B-right}. It is obtained as follows. In round one, for each belief about the strategies of the other player, there is a type that holds that belief. So, here too,
Now consider a type t a that strongly believes R 1 b . Recall that, conditional on Bob choosing not to burn, each type of Ann assigns probability 1 to the event that "Bob believes that 'Ann plays Up, when Bob does not burn.'" So if t a strongly believes R 1 b , it must assign zero probability to {NB-Right} × T b . For such a type t a , (Down-down t a ) is irrational. So
But now, if (s b t b ) is rational and t b strongly believes R 2 a , then s b = B-right, and so
Why the difference between the two approaches? We began with an epistemic structure and used the structure itself to form the set of first-order beliefs = C(S b ) × C(S a ). (So for each μ a ∈ a = C(S b ), there is type t a ∈ T a such that the marginal of β a (t a ) on S b is μ a , and likewise for b.) With this set of first-order beliefs, the strategies that survive one round of -rationalizability are exactly the strategies that are consistent with rationality. But in the next round, we lose the equivalence: If β a (t a ) strongly believes R 1 b , then the marginal of β a (t a ) must strongly believe
(Here, we use the marginalization property of strong belief.) Thus proj S a R 2 a ⊆ S 2 a . But the converse does not hold. We have Down-down ∈ S 2 a , but Down-down / ∈ proj S a R 2 a . The reason is that, conditional on Bob choosing NB, each β a (t a ) assigns probability 1 to the event "Bob assigns probability 1 to [Up] a ." So if Bob does not burn, Ann can only maintain a hypothesis that Bob is rational if she assigns probability 1 to Bob's playing NB-Left, in which case the choice Down is not a best response. With this, S We begin by showing that for the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, any EFBRS results in the Defect-Defect path of play. To show this, we need to make use of certain properties of EFBRS's. We again make use of these properties in Appendix D. We begin with the best response property.
Definition 15. Say Q a × Q b ⊆ S a × S b satisfies the best response property if, for each s a ∈ Q a , there is a CPS μ a ∈ C(S b ), so that s a ∈ ρ a (μ a ) and μ a strongly believes Q b , and similarly for b.
An EFBRS satisfies the best response property. But the converse need not hold, i.e., Q a × Q b may satisfy the best response property, but fail to be an EFBRS because it violates the maximality condition. (See the example in Section 5.)
Let us introduce some notation to relate the whole game to its parts. Fix a game and a subgame . Write H a for the set of a's information sets that are contained in . We abuse notation and write S a ( ) for the set of strategies of that allow . We also write S a = h∈H a C a (h) for the set of strategies of a in the subgame . Each strategy s a ∈ S a can be viewed as the projection of a strategy s a ∈ S a ( ) into S a . Given a set E a ⊆ S a , write E a for the set of strategies s a ∈ S a so that there is some s a ∈ E a ∩ S a ( ) whose projection into S a is s a . We write π a and π b for the payoff functions associated with the subtree . Proof. If Q a × Q b = ∅ (if no profile in Q a × Q b allows ), then it is immediate that Q a × Q b satisfies the best response property. So we suppose Q a × Q b = ∅. Fix a strategy s a ∈ Q a . Then there exists a strategy s a ∈ Q a ∩ S a ( ) whose projection into h∈H a C a (h) is s a . Since s a ∈ Q a , we can find a CPS μ a ∈ C(S b ) so that s a ∈ ρ a (μ a ) and μ a strongly believes Q b .
Let S b be the set of all
Since s a allows and s a is sequentially optimal under μ a , it follows that s a is sequentially optimal under ν a . Fix some
This establishes that ν a strongly believes Q b .
Interchanging a and b establishes the result.
We use Lemma 1 to show the next lemma.
Lemma 2. Consider the N-repeated prisoner's dilemma as given in Figure 4 . If Q a × Q b satisfies the best response property for this game, then each strategy profile in Q a × Q b results in the Defect-Defect path.
Proof. The proof very closely follows the proof of Example 3.2 in Brandenburger and Friedenberg (2010) . It is by induction on N. For N = 1, the result is immediate. Assume the result holds for some N and we show it holds for N + 1. Consider some Q a × Q b of the N + 1 repeated prisoner's dilemma that satisfies the best response property. Suppose there is a strategy s a ∈ Q a that plays Cooperate in the first period. Putting the above together gives that under any CPS that strongly believes Q b , we must have that r a is a strictly better response than s a ∈ Q a at the first information set. But this contradicts Q a × Q b satisfying the best response property. Now we turn to Proposition 2. We show the result for a somewhat more general set of games, i.e., games where, in a sense, the information structure is determined by the subgames.
Definition 16. Fix a game . Say a subgame is sufficient for an information set h ∈ H if h is contained in and the set of strategy profiles that allow is exactly S a (h) × S b (h).
Notice that there may be two subgames, viz. and¯ , that are sufficient for h. 14 If so, either is a subgame of¯ or¯ is a subgame of . When there are two subgames that are sufficient for h, we typically are interested in the last subgame sufficient for h, i.e., so that no proper subgame of is sufficient for h. Also notice that there may be no subgame that is sufficient for an information set h. Refer to the game in Figure 5 . There the only subgame is the entire game. But this subgame is not sufficient for the information set, viz. h, at which Bob moves. To see this, notice that the strategy s a = Out (trivially) allows the subgame, but does not allow h.
Definition 17. Say a game is determined by its subgames if, for each information set h ∈ H, there is a subgame that is sufficient for h.
The game in Figure 5 is not determined by its subgame; as we have seen, there is no subgame that is sufficient for the information set at which Bob moves. Battigalli and Friedenberg (2009) characterize Definition 17 in terms of primitives of the game (as opposed to a condition about strategies).
Before stating the generalization of Proposition 2, we need to extend the definition of NRT to cover games with imperfectly observable actions.
Definition 18. Fix two distinct terminal nodes z = (x c 1 c K ) and z = (x d 1 d L ). Say a is decisive for (z z ) if the following conditions hold.
The idea is that a is decisive for
) if a is the only player who determines which of the two terminal histories occurs. So a moves at the last common predecessor of z and z , viz. x, and makes distinct choices at this node, i.e., c 1 a = d 1 a . But b's choice along these paths does not determine which of z vs. z occurs. So b makes the same choice whenever he cannot observe a's choice among c 1 a vs. d 1 a .
Remark 3. If the game has observable actions, then a is decisive for
Definition 19 (Battigalli 1997) . A game satisfies no relevant ties (NRT) if whenever a (resp. b) is decisive for (z z ), a (z) = a (z ). Now, here is the generalization of Proposition 2.
Proposition 5. Fix a game that is determined by its subgames and a pure-strategy SPE, viz. (s a s b )
.
Before coming to the proof, it is useful to record some facts about games determined by their subgames. Fix a pure-strategy SPE, viz. (s a s b ) , of a game determined by its subgames. Construct maps f a : H → S a and f b : H → S b that depend on this SPE. To do so, fix some h ∈ H and let be the last subgame sufficient for h. Write x for the root of subgame (which may be itself ). If = , set f a (h) = s a . If is a proper subtree of , then we can write x = (c 1 c K ). In this case, let f a (h) be the strategy that (i) chooses c 1 a at {φ}, (ii) chooses c k a at an information set that contains (c 1 c k−1 ), i.e., an initial segment of (c 1 c K ), and (iii) makes the same choice as s a at all other information sets. So if s a allows h, then f a (h) = s a . Also, f a (h) is well defined and allows h precisely because is determined by its subgames. (Again, refer to the game in Figure 5 , and take h to be the information set at which Bob moves. Consider the SPE (s a s b ) = (Out Right). Then f a (h) = Out, which precludes h.)
Write S(h) for the set of strategy profiles that allow an information set h. In games determined by their subgames, there is a natural order on sets of the form S(h) for h ∈ H. Specifically, for any pair of information sets h and i (in H), either S(h) ⊆ S(i), S(i) ⊆ S(h), or S(h) ∩ S(i) = ∅. 15 To see this, let h (resp. i ) be sufficient for h (resp. i). We have that either h is a subgame of i , i is a subgame of h , or they are disjoint subgames. With this, the order follows from the definition of sufficiency. If S(h) ⊆ S(i), say h follows i. Say h and i are ordered if either h follows i or i follows h. Say h and i are unordered otherwise, i.e., if S(h) ∩ S(i) = ∅.
The proofs of the following results are immediate. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Fix a pure-strategy SPE, viz. (s a s b ). Construct maps f a : H → S a and f b : H → S b as above. We use these maps to construct CPS's μ a ∈ C(S b ) and μ b ∈ C(S a ). Specifically, set μ a (f b (h)|S b (h)) = 1 for each h ∈ H a . And likewise for a and b interchanged. First we show that μ a is indeed a CPS. It is immediate that μ a satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) of Definition 1. For condition (iii), fix information sets h i ∈ H a so that
as required. And likewise for b. Now let Q a = ρ a (μ a ), i.e., the set of all strategies r a that are sequentially optimal under μ a , and likewise set Q b = ρ b (μ b ). We show that Q a × Q b is an EFBRS.
Fix some r a ∈ Q a . We show that r a and μ a jointly satisfy conditions (i)-(iii) of an EFBRS. In fact, it is immediate that conditions (i) and (iii) are satisfied, so we show condition (ii), i.e., that μ a strongly believes Q b .
Fix an information set
Note that if either i follows h or h and i are unordered, then f b (h) = f b (i) . In either case, we can apply Lemma 4 to the information set i and get the desired result. So we focus on the case where h follows i.
. Consider the information set j, so that the last common predecessor of ζ(f a (i) r b ) and ζ(f a (i) f b (h)) is contained in j. Now use the fact that r b and f b (h) both allow h to get that either j follows h or j and h are unordered. In these cases, we have that
(This was established in the previous paragraph.) But now notice that, since either j follows h or j and h are unordered, we also have that either j follows i or j and i are unordered. In either case, using the fact that f a (i) allows j, we have f a (i) = f a (j) (Lemma 3). So putting the above facts together, we get
But this contradicts the assumption that π b (f a (i) 
We have established that
Fix some strategy r a / ∈ [s a ]. Then there exists some r b ∈ S b with ζ(s a r b ) = ζ(r a r b ). Consider the last common predecessor of ζ(s a r b ) and ζ(r a r b ), viz. x, and let h be the information set that contains this node. Then there exists (c 1 c K ) and
So a is decisive for (ζ(s a r b ) ζ(r a r b )). Now, by the analysis above, we have that π a (s a f b (h)) ≥ π a (r a f b (h)). NRT says that, in fact, π a (s a f b (h)) > π a (r a f b (h)). This implies that r a / ∈ Q a , as required.
Lemma 6. If has observable actions, then is determined by its subgames.
Proof. Fix an information set h. Since has observable actions, h = {x} for some node/history x. Now consider a node y that follows x. Then by observable actions, y is contained in the information set {y}. It follows that there is a subgame whose initial node is x, written . Moreover, the set of strategies that allow is exactly S a (h) × S b (h). So is determined by its subgames.
The proof of Proposition 2 is immediate from Proposition 5 and Lemma 6. Finally, we conclude by pointing out the need for NRT in Proposition 5(ii).
Example 12. Figure 9 gives a game that fails NRT. Since it is a perfect-information game, it is determined by its subgames. Here, (In Across) is a pure-strategy SPE, but {In} × {Across} is not an EFBRS.
There is an EFBRS, viz. In this appendix, we prove Propositions 3 and 4. We also provide examples to better understand the results.
D.I No ties and Proposition 3
Part (i) of Proposition 3 requires TDI and part (ii) of Proposition 3 requires NRT. Example 13 explains why part (i) requires TDI.
Example 13. Return to Example 12, which fails TDI. There we see that (In Down) is contained in an EFBRS. But it is not outcome equivalent to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. ♦
Observe that when Bob moves, he is indifferent between In and Out. Now turn to a type of Ann that strongly believes Bob is rational. This type has a correct belief about what Bob's payoff will be if she plays In. But because the game fails TDI, she may have an incorrect belief about what her own payoff will be if she plays In. As such, a Nash outcome need not obtain.
Example 14 explains why we cannot replace NRT with the (weaker) TDI condition in part (ii) of Proposition 3. (The strategy In-Down for Ann is dominated at her second information set, and the strategy In-Across for Bob is dominated at his second information set.) Also, In-Across is a weakly dominant strategy for Ann. So condition (iii) of an EFBRS implies that In-Across ∈ Q a . It follows that if μ b strongly believes Q a , then μ b must assign probability 1 to In-Across conditional on the event "Ann plays In." So In-Down is Bob's only strategy that is sequentially optimal given a CPS that strongly believes Q a . This implies that Q b = {In-Down} and so Q a = {In-Across}. ♦
In the above example, {(Out Out)} is disjoint from any EFBRS. While it satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) of an EFBRS, it fails condition (iii): If (Out Out) is played, Ann gets a payoff of 2. But by going In, she can also assure herself an expected payoff of at least 2. As such, condition (iii) requires that we include In-Across.
To better understand what is going on, let us recast this at the epistemic level: If (Out t a ) is rational, so is (In-Across t a ). With this, if Bob strongly believes that Ann is rational, then when his first information set is reached, he must maintain a hypothesis that Ann is playing In-Across; that is, he must maintain a hypothesis that Ann is playing a particular strategy that is not in Q a = {Out}. As such, Out cannot be a best response for Bob.
The key is that the rationality of (Out t a ) has implications for Ann's rationality at information sets precluded by Out. Notice that this happens because Ann is indifferent between the terminal nodes reached by (Out Out) and (In-Across Out). (If Ann's payoffs from (In-Across Out) are strictly less than 2, (Out t a ) can be rational without (In-Across t a ) being rational. Similarly, if Ann's payoffs from (In-Across Out) are strictly greater than 2, then (Out Out) would not be a Nash equilibrium.) This is where the NRT condition comes in-it says that if Ann is decisive between two terminal nodes (as she is here), then she cannot be indifferent between those nodes.
D.II Proof of Proposition 3(i)
The proof follows immediately from the following lemma.
Lemma 7. Fix a perfect-information game that satisfies TDI. If Q a × Q b satisfies the best response property, then each (s a s b ) ∈ Q a × Q b is outcome equivalent to a Nash equilibrium.
The proof of this lemma closely follows the proof of Proposition 6.1a in Brandenburger and Friedenberg (2010) . It is by induction on the length of the tree. Specifically, fix a game and a subgame . The induction hypothesis states that if a set satisfies the best response property on , then it is outcome equivalent to some Nash equilibrium. We know that if a set Q a × Q b satisfies the best response property on , it also satisfies the best response property on the subgame . (This is Lemma 1.) So if we fix a set that satisfies the best response property on the whole tree, then, by the induction hypothesis, it is outcome equivalent to a Nash equilibrium on each reached subgame. The proof uses this fact to construct a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium on the whole tree that is outcome equivalent to each profile in Q a × Q b . Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of the tree. First, fix a tree of length 1 and suppose Ann moves at the initial node. Then Bob's strategy set is a singleton. So if Q a ×Q b satisfies the best response property, then Ann is indifferent between each (s a s b ) and (r a s b ) in Q a × Q b . By TDI, each profile in Q a × Q b is outcome equivalent.
Assume the result holds for any tree of length l or less. Fix a tree of length l + 1 and a set Q a × Q b satisfying the best response property. Suppose Ann moves at the initial node and can choose among nodes n 1 n K . Each n k can be identified with an information set and each is associated with a subgame = k.
In particular, fix some subgame k with Q k a × Q k b = ∅. Then Q k a × Q k b satisfies the best response property for the subgame k. (This is Lemma 1.) So by the induction hypothesis,
(Here, we use the fact that Ann moves at the initial node.) Thus, given two strategies s a r a ∈ Q a ∩ S a ( ) and s b r b ∈ Q b , we have that π(s a s b ) = π(r a r b ). Now fix some (s a s b ) (r a r b ) ∈ Q a × Q b , where s a ∈ S a (k) and r a ∈ S a (j). We have already established that π(s a s b ) = π(r a r b ), for k = j. Suppose k = j. Since s a ∈ Q a , s a is sequentially optimal under some μ a (·|·) that strongly believes Q b . So, in particular, s a is optimal under μ a (·|S b ) with μ a (Q b |S b ) = 1. With this,
= π a (r a r b ) (The first equality follows from the fact that for each q b ∈ Q b , π a (s a s b ) = π a (s a q b ) . This is a consequence of the last line in the preceding paragraph; likewise for the last equality.) By an analogous argument, π a (r a r b ) ≥ π a (s a s b ). So, π a (r a r b ) = π a (s a s b ). By TDI, π b (r a r b ) = π b (s a s b ).
Proof of Lemma 7. The proof is by induction on the length of the tree. First, fix a tree of length 1 and suppose Ann moves at the initial node. Then Bob's strategy set is a singleton. The result follows from the fact that each s a ∈ Q a is sequentially optimal under a CPS. Now assume the result holds for any tree of length l or less. Suppose Ann moves at the initial node, and can choose among nodes n 1 n K . Each n k can be identified with an information set and each is associated with a subgame = k.
Fix some (s a s b ) ∈ Q a × Q b and suppose s a ∈ S a (1). Note that Q 1 a × Q 1 b satisfies the best response property (Lemma 1). So by the induction hypothesis, there is a Nash equilibrium of subgame 1, viz.
. Consider a strategy r a ∈ S a (1) so that the projection of r a onto h∈H 1 a C a (h) is r 1 a . We need to show that we can choose r 2
is then a Nash equilibrium of the game.
Since s a ∈ Q a , there exists a CPS and an associated measure μ a (·|S b ) so that 
gives the desired profile.
D.III Proof of Proposition 3(ii)
Let us give the idea of the proof. We start with a set Q a × Q b = {(s a s b )}, where (s a s b ) is a pure Nash equilibrium in sequentially justifiable strategies. This set satisfies the best response property. (See Lemma 10 below.) In particular, the set Q a is associated with a single CPS μ a , satisfying the conditions of the best response property. We look at the set P a of all strategies r a that are sequentially optimal under μ a . We use the fact that μ a strongly believes Q b (so assigns probability 1 to s b at the initial information set) to get that Ann is indifferent between all outcomes associated with P a × Q b . Indeed, by NRT, these strategy profiles must reach the same terminal node. Likewise, we define P b and, using standard properties of a PI game tree, we get that all strategies in P a × P b reach the same terminal node. So what have we done? We began with a set Q a × Q b and we expanded it to a set P a × P b , with (i) Q a × Q b ⊆ P a × P b , (ii) all the profiles in P a × P b reach the same terminal node, and (iii) there is a CPS μ a (resp. μ b ) that strongly believes Q b (resp. Q a ) and such that P a (resp. P b ) is the set of strategies that are sequentially optimal under μ a (·|·) (resp. μ b (·|·)). We have successfully in constructed an EFBRS if the CPS μ a (resp. μ b ) strongly believes P b (resp. P a ) instead of Q b (resp. Q a ). The key is that we can similarly expand P a × P b so that the new set satisfies similar properties. Since the game is finite, eventually the expanded set must coincide with the original set; that is, condition (i) must hold with equality. This gives the desired result. Now we turn to the proof. First, we give a technical lemma.
Lemma 9. Fix some ( E) where is finite. Let μ(·|·) be a CPS on ( E) and let be a measure on . Construct ν(·|·) :
Proof. Let μ, , and ν be as in the statement of the lemma. Conditions (i) and (ii) of a CPS are immediate. Turn to condition (iii). For this, fix E ∈ B( ) and F G ∈ E with E ⊆ F ⊆ G. First suppose that Supp ∩ F = ∅. Then
where the first equality makes use of the fact that E ⊆ G, and the last equality makes use of the fact that E ⊆ F and F ⊆ G. b. And, likewise, there is a CPS μ b ∈ C(S a ) satisfying analogous conditions.
Notice that we define only an expansion of a set Q a × Q b if Q a × Q b is a constant set. Also, if P a × P b is an expansion of Q a × Q b , then there are CPS's μ a and μ b that satisfy conditions (i)-(iii) of Definition 21. We refer to these as the associated CPS's.
Lemma 11. Fix a PI game satisfying NRT. Suppose P a × P b is an expansion of Q a × Q b , and fix associated CPS's μ a and μ b . Let X a be the set of strategies that are optimal under μ a (·|S b ) and likewise define X b . Then X a × X b is a constant set.
Proof. Since P a × P b is an expansion of Q a × Q b , then Q a × Q b is a constant set. (This is by definition.) It follows from condition (iii) of Definition 21 and NRT that X a × Q b and Q a × X b are constant sets. Then using NRT, each profile in X a × Q b reaches the same terminal node. And likewise for Q a × X b . In fact, the terminal node reached by X a × Q b and Q a × X b must be the same one, since (X a × Q b ) ∩ (Q a × X b ) = (Q a × Q b ). Now fix a profile (s a r b ) ∈ (X a \ Q a ) × (X b \ Q b ). Note that there is a profile (s a s b ) ∈ (X a \ Q a ) × Q b and a profile (r a r b ) ∈ Q a × (X b \ Q b ). These profiles reach the same terminal node and so (s a r b ) must also reach that terminal node. This establishes that X a × X b is a constant set.
Corollary 4. Fix a PI game satisfying NRT. If P a × P b is an expansion of some Q a × Q b , then P a × P b is constant.
The next result is standard, so the proof is omitted.
Lemma 12. Fix a measure a ∈ P(S b ) so that s a is optimal under a given S a . Then, for any information set h with s a ∈ S a (h) and a (S b (h)) > 0, s a is optimal under a (·|S b (h)) given S a (h).
Lemma 13. Fix a PI game that satisfies NRT. If P a × P b is an expansion of Q a × Q b , then there exists some W a × W b that is an expansion of P a × P b .
Proof. Begin with the fact that P a × P b is an expansion of Q a × Q b and choose an associated CPS μ a (resp. μ b ) that satisfies the conditions of Definition 21. Let X a (resp. X b ) be the set of strategies that are optimal under μ a (·|S b ) (resp. μ b (·|S a )). By Lemma 11, X a × X b is a constant set.
Construct a measure a ∈ P(S b ) as follows: Begin with a measure a with Supp a = P b . Construct a so that, for each r b ∈ P b , a (r b ) = (1 − ε)μ a (r b |S b ) + ε a (r b )
where ε ∈ (0 1). Note that μ a strongly believes Q b ⊆ P b so Supp μ a (·|S b ) ⊆ P b . With this and the fact that Supp a = P b , we have Supp a = P b . Using the fact that X a × P b is a constant set, then π a (s a a ) = π a (r a a ) for all s a r a ∈ X a . Moreover, when ε is sufficiently small, π a (s a a ) > π a (r a a ) for all s a ∈ X a and r a ∈ S a \ X a . So we can choose a so that s a is optimal under a if and only if s a ∈ X a . Now construct a CPS ν a ∈ C(S b ) as follows: If P b ∩ S b (h) = ∅, let ν a (·|S b (h)) = a (·|S b (h)). (This is well defined since, in this case, a (S b (h)) > 0.) If P b ∩ S b (h) = ∅, let ν a (·|S b (h)) = μ a (·|S b (h)). Lemma 9 establishes that ν a (·|·) is a CPS. Construct a measure b ∈ P(S a ) and a CPS ν b ∈ C(S a ) analogously.
Take W a = ρ a (ν a ) and W b = ρ b (ν b ). We show that W a × W b is an expansion of P a × P b . Begin with condition (i) . By definition, W a = ρ a (ν a ). So, we need to show only that P a ⊆ W a . Fix some s a ∈ P a . By construction, s a is optimal under a . Let h ∈ H a with s a ∈ S a (h). If P b ∩ S b (h) = ∅, then a (·|S b (h)) = ν a (·|S b (h)) and s a is optimal under ν a (·|S b (h)) among all strategies in S a (h). (See Lemma 12.) If P b ∩ S b (h) = ∅, then ν a (·|S b (h)) = μ a (·|S b (h)). So, again, s a is optimal under ν a (·|S b (h)) given all strategies in S a (h). With this, s a ∈ ρ a (ν a (·|·)), as required.
Next, turn to condition (ii). We need to show that ν a strongly believes P b . For this, notice that if P b ∩ S b (h) = ∅, then ν a (P b |S b (h)) = a (P b |S b (h)) = 1.
Finally, we show condition (iii). Suppose r a is optimal under ν a (·|S b ). We show that π a (r a s b ) = π a (s a s b ) for all (s a s b ) ∈ P a × P b . To see this, recall, ν a (·|S b ) = a . So if r a is optimal under ν a (·|S b ), then r a ∈ X a . The claim now follows from the fact that X a × X b is a constant set that contains P a × P b .
Replacing b with a establishes that W a × W b is an expansion of P a × P b . Proof. Fix a Nash equilibrium in sequentially optimal strategies, viz. (s a s b ) . Let Q 0 a × Q 0 b = {s a } × {s b }. By Lemma 10, Q 0 a × Q 0 b satisfies the best response property. So there is a CPS μ a (resp. μ b ) that strongly believes {s b } (resp. {s a }) and so that s a (resp. s b ) is sequentially optimal under μ a (resp. μ b ). Let Q 1 a = ρ a (μ a ) (resp. 
D.IV Closing the gap
In the text, we mentioned that there is a gap between parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 3. We begin by pointing out that we cannot improve part (ii) to say that, starting from any pure Nash equilibrium, we get an EFBRS. To see this, refer to Figure 11 . There is a unique EFBRS, namely {In} × {Across}. That said, the pair (Out Down) is a Nash equilibrium-of course, it is not a Nash equilibrium in sequentially justifiable strategies.
We do not know if part (i) can be improved to read, If Q a × Q b satisfies the best response property, then each (s a s b ) ∈ Q a × Q b is outcome equivalent to a sequentially justifiable Nash equilibrium. Let us better understand the problem.
Return to Lemma 7 and the proof thereof. Suppose, we strengthened the induction hypothesis so that we can look at a sequentially justifiable Nash equilibrium of subgame 1, viz. is the minimax strategy on subtree k. But now we need to show that the constructed equilibrium is sequentially justifiable. Here is where the problem arises: the strategy q k b (on subtree k) may not be a best response to any strategy on that subtree. Thus, the proof breaks down. Of course, it may very well be that there is another method of proof.
In the text, we mentioned a related result (Proposition 4), which speaks to the gap. To show this result, it suffices to show the following lemma.
Lemma 15. Suppose Q a × Q b is a constant set that satisfies the best response property. Then there exists a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, viz. (σ a σ b ) , so that
